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COMMENTS
THE ASSESSMENT AND TAXATION OF EASEMENTS
A sells a plot of ground to B, reserving in the grant an easement of
way across B's property. B becomes delinquent in the payment of his
taxes on the property and allows it to go by tax foreclosure. C pur-
chases the property at the tax foreclosure sale and now attempts to
keep A from using the right of way, asserting that the title he de-
rived from the tax sale has cut off A's right of easement. The resulting
problem has received varied treatment in the different jurisdictions
of this country. The apparent conflict in the decisions can be partially
explained by differences in the taxing statutes of the respective states.'
In those states where the proceedings for the collection of real prop-
erty taxes are in personam, i. e., where the state looks to the owner
rather than to the land itself for the payment of the tax, 2 the solution
is relatively simple. If the land is ultimately sold for taxes, the
purchaser at the sale secures only a derivative title, that of the person
against whom the tax was assessed. There having been no assessment
against the owner of the easement, that interest is not extinguished by
the tax sale of the servient estateA
In those jurisdictions whose statutes provide for an in rem pro-
cedure of collection, i. e., where the state looks to the land for the
payment of the tax, no personal liability of the owner being involved,
the solution is more difficult and various results are reached. Several
states in this group do not tax easements nor take them into consid-
eration when assessing the tax.4 The rule generally in these states
is that the tax sale extinguishes the easement on the theory that the
tax deed is a new title from the sovereign free from prior incumbrances,
liens or easements.5 These courts justify their results on grounds of
policy6 and statutory construction.7
1Notes (1924) 40 A. L. R. 1523; Kloek, Effect of Tax Deeds on Ease-
ments and Rights of Way (1937) 16 CHI-KENT L. REv. 328.2The statutes of 16 states seem to indicate that the tax collecting pro-
cedure is in personam. Ala., Ariz., Cal. Colo., Conn., Del., Ind., Ky., Ohio,
Okla., Penn., S. C., Tenn., Vt., Va., W. Va. This list is taken from Kloek,
aupra note 1.
3Dyer v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 14 Ala. 622 (1848). See ALA. CODE
1928 § 3123.
'There are 21 states in this group. Ark., Fla., Ga., Idaho, IlL, Iowa,
Kan., Me., Md., Mass., Minn., Miss., Neb., Nev., N. M., N. C., N. D., R. I.,
S. D., Utah, Wis. This list is taken from Kloek, supra note 1.
5 Nedderman v. Des Moines, 221 Iowa 1352, 268 N. W. 36 (1936); Hill v.
Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65 Atl. 413 (1906); Alamogordo Improvement Co.
v. Hennessee, 40 N. M. 162, 56 P. (2d) 1127 (1936) (tax sale conveyed land
free of a restriction on the sale of liquor on the premises).
6 "It is not compatible with public conveniience and the prompt col-
lection of revenue for the state to trace out all the subdivided or qual-
ified property interests that may be held in realty, and seek to hold
the various owners responsible. Its policy is to assess the fee-simple
value of the land to the holder of the possession where its real owner
is not apparent or accessible, leaving the parties interested to adjust
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The courts of other states have ruled that the easement is as-
sessable separate and apart from the servient estate. Where there
is such an assessment the easement is not affected by the tax sale of
the servient tenement.3
A third group of states that employ the in rem machinery for the
collection of real property taxes holds that the tax is assessed against
the dominant tenement with the easement included. A tax sale of
the servient estate does not cut off the easementY These decisions are
grounded on policy10 and statutory construction.1' Tax Lien Co. of
N. Y. V. Schultze12 aptly illustrates the reason for assessing the ease-
ment with the dominant estate.
"When an easement is carved out of one property for the
benefit of another, the market value of the servient estate
is thereby lessened, and that of the dominant increased prac-
tically by just the value of the easement; the respective tene-
ments should therefore be assessed accordingly . . 2"
This rule appears to be applicable whenever the assessment is based
on the "value" of the property. An easement furnishing means of
ingress and -egress to an otherwise inaccessible dominant tenement
would undoubtedly increase the value of that tenement. It is a factor
that must necessarily be considered by the assessor if he is to ascer-
tain the fair value of the property.
the proportions of liability between themselves." Hill v. Williams, 104
Md. 595, 65 Atl. 413 (1906).
7Typical statutes in these jurisdictions are represented by Gm. STAT.
of KANs. 1935, c. 79, § 2501 (" . . . tax deed shall V'est in the grantee an
absolute estate in fee simple . . .") and MAsoN's MN . STAT. 1927 § 2130,
which provides that the purchaser gets the property free from "any claim,
lien, or encumbrance . . ." Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65 At. 413
(1906) interpreted a Md. statute holding the word "incumbrance" to
include "easements."
OConservative Homestead Assoc. v. Conery, 169 La. 573, 125 So. 621
(1929) rehearing denied (1930); Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry,
104 Mont. 289, 66 P. (2d) 792 (1937); Bellow Falls Canal Co. v. Town of
Walpole, 76 N. H. 384, 83 At. 95 (1912) (PuB. LAws OF N. H. 1926 c. 66,
§ 38 provides "any separate interest in land . . . shall be taken to be
real estate. . ."); City of Fort Worth v. Southwestern Bell Tele. Co., 80
F. (2d) 972, (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Wyoming has no cases but Wyo. REV.
STAT. 1933, § 115-2337 seems to indicate that it would fall into line with
this group of states.
9 $tansell v. American Radiator Co., 163 Mich. 528, 128 N. W. 789 (1910);
State ex rel. Koeln v. West Cabanne Improvement Co., 278 Mo. 310, 213
S. W. 25 (1919); Ebren Realty Co. v. Magna Charta Bldg. & Loan Assoc.
of Newark, 120 N. J. Eq. 136, 184 AtL 203 (1936); Jackson v. Smith, 153
App. Div. 724, 138 N. Y. Supp. 654 (1912), affd., 213 N. Y. 630, 107 N. E.
1079 (1914); Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Ore. 229, 274 Pac. 306 (1929).
10 Schafly v. Baumann, 341 Mo. 755, 108 S. W. (2d) 363 (1937) said that
selling of the property free from the building restriction would make
the adjacent property less valuable for taxation purposes.
21Stansell v. American Radiator Co., 163 Mich. 528, 128 N. W. 789 (1910).
This decision was based on CoAe. LAWs OF MIIc. 1929 § 3390: "For the
purpose of taxation, real property shall include all lands within the state,
and all buildings and fixtures thereon, and appurtenances thereto . . ."
An easement was considered an appurtenance to the land. See REM.
REV. STAT. § 11108.
12 213 N. Y. 9, 106 N. E. 751, L. R. A. 1915D, 1115, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 636
(1914).
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The Washington statute13 provides that "value" shall be the basis
for assessment. Nevertheless the Washington court has not reached
the result dictated by the New York case above. The cases have re-
peatedly held that the statute prescribing the tax lien14 provides for
an in rem procedure for collection of real property taxes and that the
tax sale of the servient tenement extinguishes the incorporeal here-
ditaments of the dominant tenement. 15 In holding that the tax title
does initiate a new title freed from all prior interests, the court has
relied on Rxm. REV. STAT. § 11260:
"All taxes and levies which may hereafter be lawfully im-
posed or assessed shall be and they are hereby declared to be
a lien on the real estate on which they may hereafter be im-
posed or assessed, which liens shall include all charges and
expenses of and concerning the said taxes which, by the provi-
sions of this act, are directed to be made. The said lien shall
have priority to and shall be fully paid and satisfied before
any recognizance, mortgage, judgment, debt, obligation or re-
sponsibility to or with which said real property may become
charged or liable."
Should not easements and other incorporeal hereditaments be dis-
tinguished from "recognizance, judgment, debt, obligation or respon-
sibility . . ."? The incorporeal hereditaments cannot be removed by
the owner of the servient tenement as he could those encumbrances
enumerated in the statute. Those encumbrances referred to in the
statute could be taken to mean removable charges. Hence, if the fore-
closure is to take precedence over only those specifically mentioned
charges, it could be logically argued that it was not intended to take
precedence over incorporeal hereditaments.
The Washington statute does not require the construction given
to it and may be distinguished from the statutes in those jurisdictions"6
that specifically state that the purchaser at the tax foreclosure sale
receives an "absolute title." Hanson v. Carr, 7 the first Washington
case to rely on this statute to strike down an easement because of the
tax sale of the servient estate, went farther than the necessities of
the facts required. It appeared from the report that the easement was
granted in 1892 and that the taxes were delinquent from 1890 to 1895.
Part of the delinquency on which the tax lien was based had accrued
prior to the grant of the easement. There was no need to rely on the
statute to find that the tax lien for the delinquent taxes from 1890
to 1892 was prior to the subsequent grant of the easement. Subse-
quent Washington cases have strongly relied on this decision for
their authority.
It therefore seems as if the Washington court should seek further
23 REM. REV. STAT. § 11135, "All property shall be assessed at 50 per cent
of its true and fair value in money
14 REr. REV. STAT. § 11260.
15 Harmon v. Gould, 1 Wn. (2d) 1, 94 P. (2d) 749 (1939); Messett v.
Cowell, 194 Wash. 646, 79 P. (2d) 337 (1938); Tamblin v. Crowley, 99 Wash.
133, 168 Pac. 982 (1917); Wilson v. Korte, 91 Wash. 30, 157 Pac. 47 (1916);
Gustaveson v. Dwyer, 78 Wash. 336, 139 Pac. 194 (1914); Hanson v. Carr, 66
Wash. 81, 118 Pac. 927 (1911).
16 See Note 7, supra.
27 66 Wash. 81, 118 Pac. 927 (1911).
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support than this statute to justify its decisions. The method of as-
sessing these interests should be the essential factor to be considered
in deciding whether or not such an interest is cut off by the tax sale
of the servient estate. Whether the easement should be assessed
separately, or included with the dominant estate, or disregarded
entirely has received little consideration from the Washington court.
Harmon v. Gould,' in a gratuitous statement, said that the collection
of taxes would be seriously hindered if the taxing authority be re-
quired to examine each tract of land for possible easements based
on prescriptive or other claims not of record. The practical difficulties
that the court seems to fear are more apparent than real. Any ac-
curate determination of the value of real property must necessarily
take into consideration these appurtenances. Whether or not they
may be observed by the naked eye is not the true test. The effect on
the value of the property is apparent, even though the easement is
not.'9
An examination of the Washington statutes does not reveal any
specific method to be followed in assessing these interests. However,
REm. REv. STAT. § 11108 offers a clue.
"The term 'real property,' for the purposes of taxation,
shall be held and construed to mean and include the land
itself, whether laid out in town lots or otherwise, and all build-
ings, structures or improvements or other fixtures of whatso-
ever kind thereon . . . and all rights and privileges thereto
belonging or in any wise appertaining . . .; and all property
which the law defines or the courts may interpret to be real
property under the letter, spirit, intent and meaning of the
law for the purposes of taxation."
This language seems to indicate that incorporeal hereditaments
appurtenant to the dominant tenement should be assessed and taxed
to that owner and not to the owner of the servient tenement.20 If so
a tax sale of the servient tenement should not affect the easement be-
cause it is assessed to the dominant tenement. The Washington cases
have not considered the effect this statute might have on the method
of assessment used.
Other statutes providing that certain easements of public service
corporations are to be preserved in the event of a tax sale of the ser-
vient tenement" may or may not be an indication of legislative intent
that private easements are not to be cut off by the sale of the ser-
vient tenement for taxes.
As a direct result of the adoption of the Washington rule in regards
to the effect of a tax sale of the servient tenement, the owner of the
dominant tenement is confronted with the difficult problem of pro-
tecting his appurtenances when the owner of the servient tenement
2S1 Wn. (2d) 1, 94 P. (2d) 749 (1939).
29 Tax Lien Co. of N. Y. v. Schultze, 213 N. Y. 9, 106 N E. 751, L. R. A.
1915D, 1115, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 636 (1914) (involving easements of light,
air and access.).
2oCrawford v. Senosky, 128 Ore. 229, 274 Pac. 306 (1929), (relying .on
ORE. ANN. CODE 1930, VoL 5, c. 69 § 722, which was copied from the Wash-
ington Property Tax Code, held that building restrictions were not cut
off by a tax sale).21 $ee Note 29, infra.
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becomes delinquent in his tax payments. Tamblin v. Crowley2 sug-
gested that the easement would be protected if the owner of the dom-
inant tenement paid all the taxes of the servient estate. The unfair-
ness of such a solution is apparent. This suggestion must also be
qualified in light of the dictum in Messett v. Colwell. 3 In that case
the servient tenement was burdened with a restrictive use. After that
estate had been sold at a tax sale, the owner of the dominant tene-
ment attempted to enforce the restriction. In answer to the purchaser's
contention that the owner of the dominant tenement could have pro-
tected himself by paying all the taxes, the court said that he had "no
taxable interest in the property."
Whether the owner of the dominant tenement could protect his
easement by recording is a matter of conjecture. It might be inferred
from Harmon v. Gould24 that recording would furnish the requisite
protection. If the easement is disregarded in the assessment of the
dominant estate it should make no difference that the interest has been
recorded insofar as it is subject to be cut off by a tax sale of the ser-
vient tenement. The court may have meant that recordation would
compel the assessor to assess the easement to the dominant tenement
thereby, under the normal result in such cases, precluding the owner
of the servient tenement from jeopardizing that interest by failing
to pay his taxes. Wilson v. Korte25 seems to eliminate that solution
by a holding that "both the record and possessory title are absolutely
destroyed by such foreclosure."
The cases 26 have also indicated that the owner of the easement
might avail himself of REM. REv. STAT. § 11264:
"Any person desiring to pay taxes upon any part or parts
of real property heretofore or hereafter assessed as one parcel,
or tract may do so by applying to the County Assessor, who
must carefully investigate and ascertain the relative or pro-
portionate value said part bears to the whole tract assessed,
on which basis the assessment must be divided, and the As-
sessor shall forthwith certify such proportionate value to
the County Treasurer . . 2'
There is no question about the right of "segregation" insofar as an
owner of an undivided interest in the property is concerned.17 The
basis for the court's reliance on this statute seems to be an early case28
in which the court ordered a reduction of taxes in favor of the owner of
the real estate on a showing that two acres of the land assessed to
him were part of a railroad right of way. It does not appear in the facts
22 "We are unable to see why it is not as necessary to pay taxes on the
land in order to save a private easement therein as it is necessary to
pay taxes on land to save any other private right therein." 99 Wash. 133,
168 Pac. 982 (1917).
2- 194 Wash. 646, 79 P. (2d) 337 (1938).
24 1 Wn. (2d) 1, 94 P. (2d) 749 (1939) (It would hinder taxing author-
ities if they were required to examine all possible easements based on
prescriptive and other claims not of record).
22 91 Wash. 30, 157 Pac. 47 (1916).
26 Harmon v. Gould, 1 Wn. (2d) 1, 94 P. (2d) 749 (1939); Tamblin v.
Crowley, 99 Wash. 133, 168 Pac. 982 (1917); Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash. 81,
118 Pac. 927 (1911); Ops. Att'y Gen. (Wash.) 1927-1928, p. 852.
27 State ex rel. McClaine v. Reed, 29 Wash. 383, 69 Pac. 1096 (1902).
28 Coolidge v. Pierce County, 28 Wash. 95, 68 Pac. 391 (1902).
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whether this right of way was merely an easement or whether the
railroad owned the two acres in fee simple. There was nothing in the
report to show that the court expressly relied on this statute. The
language of the statute does not necessarily indicate that the owner
of an incorporeal hereditament as distinguished from an owner of an
undivided interest would be given the benefit of "segregation."
Although the Washington Property Tax Code provides for an'in rem
procedure for'the collection of real property taxes, it does not neces-
sarily follow that a tax sale of the servient tenement must extinguish
the incorporeal hereditaments of the dominant tenement. The method
of assessing those interests should be the controlling factor in what-
ever result is reached. In any event, the series of decisions in Wash-
ington have created an urgent need for some satisfactory method
by which the owner of the dominant tenement can protect these in-
terests. I -
In view of the vagueness of the statutory requirehents for a method
of assessing incorporeal hereditaments; the absence of specific statu-
tory remedies by which the owner of the dominant tenement may
protect his interests when the owner of the servient tenement defaults
in the payment of his taxes; and the added uncertainty of his position
as a result of the Washington court's decisions, the legislature should
amend the present statutes to provide specifically for a method of as-
sessing incorporeal hereditaments, and to provide specifically for
remedies available to the owner of the dominant tenement so that he
may be able to forecast with some degree of accuracy the steps he must
take to preserve those interests. A satisfactory solution would be
reached by extending the pertinent provisions of the statutes2 9 relat-
ing to easements of public service corporations to all easements. The
servient tenement would then be assessed and taxed as real estate sub-
ject to such an easement, and a purchaser at the tax sale would take
the real estate subject to that easement.
SNYDER JED KING.
29REm. R E. STAT. § 11188 (certain easements of public service cor-
porations shall be taxed as personalty.); REM. REv. STAT. § 11189 (real
estate subject to any such easement shall be assessed and taxed as real
estate subject to such easement); REM. REv. STAT. § 11190 (". . . when
any such realty is sold for delinquent taxes thereon it shall be sold sub-
ject to such easement and the purchaser at any such tax sale shall acquire
no title to such easement or the property constructed upon or occupying
the same....).
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